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Editors' Summary 
THE  BROOKINGS PANEL on Economic  Activity held its sixty-second con- 
ference in Washington,  D.C., on September  5 and 6, 1996. This issue 
of  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity  includes  the  articles  and 
discussions presented  at that conference. The first paper employs ad- 
vanced statistical  technique  to analyze  the importance  of monetary  pol- 
icy and the mechanisms  by which it affects the economy. The second 
demonstrates  the importance  of variations  in the workweek  of capital 
in the business cycle. These papers are followed by a symposium on 
the economies of the Pacific Rim. The first symposium  paper  revisits 
the debate on the relative importance  of total factor productivity  and 
capital  accumulation  in explaining  rapid  economic growth  in East  Asia. 
The second considers  Japan's  experience, both with successful growth 
and, ultimately, with its financial bubble and recent stagnation. The 
third  examines China's economic development  over the past two dec- 
ades and its prospects  for the future. Three extended comments offer 
observations  about  past and  prospective  growth  in the region and else- 
where. Brookings is grateful to the Korea Foundation  for financial 
support  for the symposium. 
T  H  E  P R  O  F  E  S S I  O N  iS still far from a consensus on the importance  of 
monetary  policy for the behavior of prices and output. In part this 
reflects the plethora  of theoretical  models ascribing different roles to 
money. In the absence of clarity about the role of  money and the 
mechanisms by which monetary events are transmitted  through the 
economy, there is a fundamental  difficulty in distinguishing the re- 
sponse of the economy to actions of the monetary  authority  from the 
responses  of policymakers  to the economy itself. One important  strand 
of recent empirical  research  attempts  to understand  the importance  of 
monetary  policy through  the use of identified vector autoregressions 
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(VARs), which place minimal restrictions  on the ways in which mon- 
etary  actions affect the economy. These models explicitly recognize  the 
dependence  of monetary  actions on other  economic variables  through  a 
policy reaction function and focus attention  on the effects of policy 
shocks or innovations.  As these methods  have been developed  to handle 
complex, multivariate  data sets, a variety of models and approaches 
has emerged. Researchers  have chosen different  data  sets, made  differ- 
ent identifying assumptions, and tended to emphasize differences be- 
tween their results, rather  than  commonalities.  In the first  paper  of this 
issue, Eric Leeper, Christopher  Sims, and Tao Zha use a single time 
frame  and  data  set to test the robustness  of results  in this recent  literature 
and  to trace  the sources of differences  in conclusions. They also extend 
the analysis to models with a much richer  array  of goods and financial 
market  variables  than  has previously  been considered,  thus providing  a 
more complete picture  of the monetary  transmission  mechanism. 
The authors  begin with an extensive discussion of the methodology 
underlying  identified vector autoregression  models, contrasting  these 
models with traditional  simultaneous equation (SE) models and the 
more recent generation of  dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE)  models. Since the authors'  subsequent  application  of identified 
VARs is accessible without a full understanding  of these methodolo- 
gies,  our discussion of this section will be brief. Each equation in a 
VAR system defines a relationship  between current  and past values of 
a list of time series and a contemporaneous  independent  disturbance. 
Under the usual assumptions,  each of the time series can be described 
as the sum of mutually  independent  components,  which are linear  com- 
binations  of the independent  disturbances.  A distinguishing  feature of 
the authors' approach  is their insistence that a well-specified model 
accounts  for all correlations  among  disturbances,  so that  the system can 
be represented  in a form in which the disturbances  have an identity 
covariance matrix. In this setup, specifying the disturbance  or distur- 
bances that correspond  to monetary  actions is equivalent  to specifying 
the equation  or equations  that  characterize  monetary  policy behavior- 
that is,  a monetary reaction function or monetary policy rule. The 
authors argue that it is unsatisfactory  to assume, for example, that 
monetary  policy disturbances  are  important  but  are  systematically  offset 
by private sector disturbances. If the offsetting disturbances  are, in 
fact, responses to policy, that  relation  should be modeled explicitly; if William  C. Brainard  and George L. Perry  xi 
they reflect the effect of private  shocks on policymaking, they should 
be part  of the model of policy behavior. 
At an abstract level  the VAR model is quite similar in form to 
traditional  simultaneous  equation  models, and  its implementation  raises 
many of the same issues. In order  to use the VAR model for economic 
policy,  it is necessary to impose restrictions that give its elements 
economic interpretation-that is, identify the model. Like traditional 
SE modelers, VAR modelers can use exact linear restrictions  on the 
coefficient elements that relate the variables  to one another  and to the 
disturbances.  However, because  of the assumption  that  the disturbances 
are independent, a VAR model needs fewer such restrictions  than a 
similarly sized SE model, which places no restrictions  on the correla- 
tions among  disturbances.  The authors  use two other  sorts  of identifying 
restrictions:  probabilistic  assertions  about  the  elements  of the coefficient 
matrix (this turns out to be problematic  in their subsequent  empirical 
work) and informal restrictions  on the reasonableness  of the impulse 
response  functions  that  trace  the effects of disturbances  on the variables 
over time. Their informal  criteria  for plausibility  are loose. For exam- 
ple, in response to monetary  contraction, they regard  as implausible 
either  significant  positive responses  of prices or output, or a significant 
negative  response of interest  rates. The authors  are unapologetic  about 
using their beliefs about the forms of impulse responses to focus on 
particular  specifications. They note that this is no different  than econ- 
omists' typical practice of adjusting  a model until it both fits the data 
and gives reasonable  results. They also observe that it would be com- 
putationally  expensive, though possible, to impose these beliefs about 
the forms of the impulse responses as precise a priori mathematical 
restrictions. 
The treatment  of policy as random  in identified VAR models has 
often been criticized. But the authors  argue  that  policy is as random  as 
any other aspect of economic behavior. It reflects the dynamic inter- 
action among members  of the Federal Reserve's Open Market  Com- 
mittee with somewhat  different  policy objectives and with uncertainty 
about  both  the condition  of the economy and  the consequences  of policy 
actions. In such circumstances,  economists are  far from a deterministic 
explanation  of policy actions. 
The authors observe that DSGE models are much more strongly 
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trary  restrictions  on functional  forms  of utility, on production  functions, 
and on the stochastic  properties  of disturbances.  The DSGE models do 
provide a complete interpretation  of the stochastic disturbances  in the 
model, but such disturbances  are  typically far fewer in number  than  are 
the variables in the system. By contrast, the identified  VAR approach 
starts  with an unidentified  model of the economy and introduces  iden- 
tifying information  cautiously. As a result, while the effects of policy 
disturbances  on the economy can be traced  out, the precise mechanism 
by which they work  their  way through  the economy may not be known. 
The authors  suggest that each approach  has its advantages  and its dis- 
advantages.  The DSGE approach  invites the erroneous  impression  that 
the data  produce  a result that  actually  flows almost entirely  from initial 
assumptions.  The identified  VAR approach  does not provide a conve- 
nient framework  for the application  of a priori  knowledge about inter- 
actions in the economy. 
Leeper, Sims, and Zha provide an historical  overview of empirical 
work that has attempted to uncover the effects of monetary policy 
actions on prices and output, highlighting the many difficulties that 
have arisen. The timing of monetary  events relative to movements in 
prices or output is easily observed and provides evidence that is un- 
doubtedly  persuasive  to many  observers.  A simple graph  of short  rates, 
for example, appears  to show that almost all postwar  U.S.  recessions 
have been preceded  by monetary  tightening, suggesting  that  policy was 
responsible  for the event. However, this simple interpretation  is subject 
to two criticisms. First, evidence from timing is notoriously sensitive 
to the treatment  of trends;  differencing  the data can dramatically  alter 
the results. The apparent  lead of interest  rates  may be simply an artifact 
of the general rise of interest  rates during  the period. Second, money, 
output, and prices may all be responding  to other  variables, rather  than 
to one another. 
The authors  elaborate  on these issues. Although evidence from the 
timing of cyclical peaks is sensitive to differencing  or other  filtering  of 
the data, more sophisticated  tests of causation are not. Monetary  ag- 
gregates, for example, do help to predict  future  output  independent  of 
data filtering. This is so even if the effects are limited to the variation 
in money that past output  does not predict. Milton Friedman  presents 
such evidence in his classic analysis of the importance  of money. To 
illustrate this result, the authors provide a simple VAR in MI,  the William  C. Brainard  and George L. Perry  xiii 
consumer price index, and GDP that indicates that an innovation in 
money leads to a smooth and slow response of the price level and a 
quicker, but less sustained, response of output. At the same time, in 
this VAR innovations  in output  and  prices have little effect on money. 
Although  these results  do not easily fit a rational  expectations  monetar- 
ist view, they are consistent  with a more eclectic monetarist  view. The 
results, however, are still vulnerable to the second criticism noted 
above. Movements  in money, although  purged  of the influences  of past 
and  contemporaneous  movements  in prices  and  output,  may  be respond- 
ing to other variables, not included in the analysis, that affect both 
current  money and subsequent  output  and prices. 
Much of the empirical work following the VAR approach  can be 
regarded  as an effort to examine  this possibility. Leeper, Sims, and  Zha 
reestimate  the models of several authors,  using a standard  data set and 
time period, to illuminate  the many  issues that  arise  and  distill whatever 
conclusions are robust. As Sims has pointed out in earlier work, al- 
though  little of the variation  in monetary  aggregates  is predictable  from 
data on past prices and output, a considerable amount is predictable 
when information  on past interest  rates is included. Leeper, Sims, and 
Zha confirm  this in a simple VAR system in which money innovations 
have little predictive power for output once the federal funds rate is 
included. However, the model reveals other  problems  that  are common 
in VAR investigations. One is the "liquidity puzzle."  Expansionary 
innovations  in monetary  aggregates, rather  than  reducing  interest  rates 
in accordance  with common  sense and  most theories, appear  to increase 
rates. Although interest rate innovations do not exhibit the reverse 
phenomenon-positive  rate  innovations  are  followed by monetary  con- 
traction-they  display the "price puzzle." Prices rise steadily follow- 
ing a positive rate innovation;  if the rate innovation  is interpreted  as a 
monetary  contraction, the results have the disconcerting implication 
that monetary  contractions  produce  inflation. 
The authors  use the four-variable  system with output, prices, MI, 
and the federal funds rate to illustrate  how restrictions  on some of the 
VAR relations can alter the results and eliminate these puzzles. They 
impose  the restraints  that  policymakers  do not respond  within  the month 
to innovations  in prices and output and that prices and output are un- 
responsive to within-month  changes in interest rates and money. In 
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federal funds rate and a decline in M1. Over the next year, the funds 
rate gradually  returns  to its initial level, while M1 remains  well below 
its initial level. Although  output  declines persistently  in response  to the 
monetary  contraction,  not much of its overall variance  is attributed  to 
the policy disturbance.  Prices move in the expected direction, but only 
slightly and statistically  insignificantly.  The system has other  attractive 
features. Every private sector shock that implies inflation generates a 
contractionary  response in the interest  rate. Indeed, most of the move- 
ment in interest  rates is accounted  for by these endogenous  responses, 
rather than by policy shocks. The authors observe that most of the 
variation  in output  and prices is accounted  for by innovations  that look 
like supply shocks, which move prices and output in opposite direc- 
tions. While the restrictions  provide  a more  satisfactory  model of policy 
shocks, some puzzles remain. It is hard to understand,  for example, 
why M  I responds  so strongly  and  persistently  when  the effects of policy 
on prices and output  are so small and the effects on interest  rates are so 
temporary. 
In other attempts  to pin down the role of policy, researchers  have 
introduced  additional  variables  that  may contain information  about  the 
future  course  of prices and  output  and  that  could influence  current  policy 
actions. To ignore such variables risks relegating their effects to the 
disturbance  term and attributing  to policy shocks events that in fact 
determine policy.  Researchers  have also explored the possibility of 
replacing monetary  aggregates with variables such as total or unbor- 
rowed reserves, which the Fed controls more directly. Such variables, 
for example, may not show the exaggerated  response of M1 revealed 
in the four-variable  model above. The authors discuss three recent 
studies by Steve Strongin;  Lawrence  Christano,  Martin  Eichenbaum, 
and Charles Evans; and Ben Bernanke  and Ilian Mihov, all of which 
introduce  some details of the banking  system and focus on the reserves 
market,  omitting  monetary  aggregates  from  the analysis. These studies 
follow the general strategy illustrated  in the four-variable  model, al- 
though  they are not always clear about  the restrictions  on the nonpolicy 
equations necessary to justify the interpretations  given to the results. 
Leeper, Sims, and  Zha conclude  that  they either  suffer  from anomalous 
results or require  implausible  restrictions. 
The inadequacies  of the relatively small models in the existing lit- 
erature  lead the authors  to construct  and analyze two much larger  sys- William  C. Brainard and George L. Perry  xv 
tems, in which they distinguish  between two aspects of Fed behavior: 
macroeconomic  policy and bank regulation.  In their view, the Federal 
Reserve is concerned with reserve and deposit flows in the short run 
primarily  because of their  potential  impact  on the funds rate, for which 
the Fed sets its objectives in the light of broader  macroeconomic  con- 
ditions. The smaller of the authors'  two models contains  thirteen  vari- 
ables, including both MI and total reserves. In addition  to GDP, the 
authors  include three of its components-consumption and residential 
and nonresidential  investment-as  well as unemployment, allowing 
them to assess in some detail the plausibility of responses to policy 
disturbances.  These variables,  together  with the general  price level and 
Ml,  are assumed to be sluggish-not  responding  to financial signals 
within the month. In addition  to the commodity  prices included in the 
simpler models, the authors  include three informational  variables:  the 
Standard  and Poor's 500 stock price index, the ten-year  Treasury  bond 
rate, and an index of the value of the dollar. Each is allowed to respond 
within the period to all other variables. As in the simpler models, the 
system includes only one short interest  rate in the policy block, since, 
with more than one short rate, it is hard  to disentangle  arbitrage  rela- 
tionships from Fed behavior. 
In view of the large number  of variables and potential pitfalls, the 
results of estimating  this model are remarkably  sensible. Shocks to the 
Fed's macroeconomic  policy equation  produce  plausible  effects. In re- 
sponse to a monetary  contraction  by the Fed, short and long interest 
rates rise, reserves and MI fall smoothly, output and its components 
fall, unemployment  rises, commodity prices drop smoothly, and the 
dollar appreciates. The impulse responses are not only qualitatively 
sensible, they are also rather  sharply  estimated. Several other results 
stand out. Reserve movements appear  to reflect the Fed's accommo- 
dation  of shifts in demand  for reserves  that are unrelated  to movements 
in Ml,  indicating that it is inappropriate  to use reserves as a single 
monetary  aggregate  variable. A private  sector shock appears  to be the 
single most important  source  of variation  in both  MI and  total  reserves, 
showing why it is unsatisfactory  to use monetary  aggregates as one- 
dimensional  policy indicators.  A large fraction  of the variance  of inter- 
est rates is attributed  to systematic  policy responses  to inflation, not to 
erratic  fluctuations  in policy. 
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replacing the short Treasury  rate with the Federal Reserve's discount 
rate and the federal funds rate, and adding  four other variables  related 
to the banking  sector. The results from this model are quite similar  to 
those from the thirteen-variable  version. They not only demonstrate  the 
feasibility of a more elaborate  description  of the monetary  process, but 
also provide insights not available  from the smaller  model. For exam- 
ple, movements in the discount rate and in the federal funds rate are 
not equivalent. A federal funds rate change "ratified" by a change in 
the discount rate has larger  and more permanent  effects than a move- 
ment in the funds rate alone. 
The authors  are encouraged  by their success with a large modeling 
framework  that gives a clearer understanding  of identification  issues 
and is able to trace  out the effects of policy actions across a wide range 
of variables. This success increases their confidence about their iden- 
tifying assumptions.  A major  lesson of the authors'  analysis is that  it is 
inappropriate  to regard movements in monetary variables mainly as 
responses to policy disturbances;  rather,  most movements  in monetary 
variables  are responses to the state of the economy, not random  devia- 
tions of the monetary  authorities  from their usual behavior. They con- 
clude that their methodology both allows the policy response process 
to be identified  empirically, and  sharpens  economists' understanding  of 
how monetary  policy, in turn, affects the economy. 
THE  PROCYCLICAL  behavior of both labor and total factor produc- 
tivity (TFP)  is a salient  feature  of the business  cycle. This characteristic 
poses a problem for the simplest models of production  that assume 
constant  returns  to scale and in which variations  of output  come from 
variations in the amount of labor that is applied to a fixed stock of 
capital. In such models labor productivity  should be countercyclical, 
reflecting the diminished returns  to labor associated with higher em- 
ployment  and  more  hours. A variety  of explanations  have been provided 
for why productivity  is not countercyclical,  ranging  from  positing short- 
run increasing returns  to scale to simply assuming that technological 
shocks are cyclical. A traditional  explanation,  more  in keeping  with the 
neoclassical view of technology, is that over the cycle, the delivery of 
capital services from a fixed capital stock varies directly with labor 
input. It has long been clear that variation  in capital services can help 
to explain cyclical productivity  qualitatively, but there has been little William  C. Brainard and George L. Perry  xvii 
direct evidence on its quantitative  importance.  In the second paper  of 
this issue, Matthew  Shapiro  provides quantitative  evidence on the im- 
portance of variation  of the workweek of capital, both for aggregate 
manufacturing  and for individual  industries. 
The essential assumption  in Shapiro's  analysis is that  the delivery of 
capital services from a given stock of capital  depends  on the number  of 
hours  for which the capital  is utilized. Shapiro  considers  three  different 
margins that affect this workweek-the  number  of shifts that capital 
operates,  the number  of hours  in each shift, and  the number  of days per 
week that the plant operates-and  examines three different  sources of 
information  about  these margins.  The Census  Bureau's  Survey  of Plant 
Capacity  (SPC) provides a direct  measure, asking how many  hours  per 
day and  days per week establishments  operate.  The SPC data  are avail- 
able for only the fourth quarter  and over a short sample period, and 
they record  only total employment, not employment  per shift. Shapiro 
makes  use of an unpublished  series constructed  by Joseph  Beaulieu and 
Joe Mattey  that aggregates  the SPC data to the industry  level, making 
necessary assumptions  about  the ratio of capital to labor across shifts. 
His two other  sources of information  are surveys  of workers  conducted 
by the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics-the  Area Wage Survey (AWS) and 
the Current  Population  Survey  (CPS)-from  which he infers  the capital 
workweek. These provide information  on the fraction of workers on 
late shifts that can be used to construct estimates of the fraction of 
workers  in plants that operate  one, two, or three shifts. The AWS data 
also require  substantial  processing  to yield the aggregate  component  of 
shift employment. In this case, Shapiro  makes use of a series for the 
aggregate  component  constructed  by Joram  Mayshar  and Gary Solon. 
The CPS data contain information  on the time at which workers start 
and  end work  and  have the advantage  of being based  on a representative 
sample  of the U.S. population.  Unlike the other  two measures,  the CPS 
data are not limited to manufacturing.  To form industry-level  aggre- 
gates, Shapiro  sums the number  of workers  per shift in each industry, 
using the CPS sampling  weights. 
The three different aggregate  measures  of the workweek of capital 
cover different  periods  but show similar  behavior.  By all measures,  the 
workweek of capital in manufacturing  is highly variable. The SPC 
measure, for example, is more than twice as variable, relative to its 
mean, than  the workweek  of labor. Dips correspond  to recessions, and xviii  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1996 
peaks correspond  to booms; the correlation  with the workweek  of labor 
is strong  but by no means perfect. The SPC and AWS series, although 
they differ significantly in their estimates of average workweek, both 
display a noticeable  upward  trend, in contrast  to the relatively  trendless 
workweek  of labor. The CPS series for manufacturing  is somewhat  less 
variable  and, not surprising,  the CPS data  for the workweek  of capital 
in nonmanufacturing  sectors are substantially  lower and less variable 
than the data for manufacturing. 
How important  are cyclical changes in the workweek  of capital and 
employment?  Shapiro  explores this question  by relating  cyclical move- 
ments in the workweek  of capital to the Federal  Reserve Board's mea- 
sure of capacity utilization, both in aggregate  and by industry,  and by 
examining the fraction  of fluctuations  in production  employment  over 
the cycle that is accounted  for by the movement  of workers  on and off 
late shifts. At the aggregate  level, as might  be expected, the correlation 
between the workweek  of capital and  capacity  utilization  is high, rang- 
ing from 0.55 to 0.85, depending  on the particular  measure  and period 
used. The aggregate data conceal dramatic  differences in the average 
workweek of capital across industries,  ranging  from 45 to 50 hours in 
industries such as apparel, furniture, and leather, to more than 125 
hours in paper, chemicals, petroleum, and primary  metals. Although 
the correlations  of the workweek of capital with output  are uniformly 
positive, they vary widely. Compared  with the average, the industries 
at either  extreme  of the distribution  of the average  workweek  generally 
show less variation in the workweek and lower correlations  between 
the workweek of capital and capacity utilization. For example, petro- 
leum, the stereotypical continuous process industry, has the highest 
average workweek of capital (156.8 hours) and the lowest correlation 
between the workweek  and  capacity  utilization  (0.06). Typically, labor 
input  and  the workweek  of capital  move together.  In order  to understand 
the importance of  capital services per se,  Shapiro runs a bivariate 
regression, controlling for total labor hours. Even holding total labor 
input fixed, the workweek of capital remains a powerful explanatory 
variable  for several  industries-nonelectrical machinery,  transportation 
equipment, paper, and rubber.  However, in others the colinearity be- 
tween the workweek  of capital and labor hours makes it impossible to 
distinguish their roles. In explaining total manufacturing  production, 
the capital workweek  dominates  production  worker  hours. William  C. Brainard  and George L. Perry  xix 
To what extent is variation in total employment accounted for by 
workers  coming on and off late shifts? From  the AWS sample, Shapiro 
estimates that the elasticity of employment  on late shifts with respect 
to total employment  is 1.62. Given the share  of shift employment,  this 
implies that  42 percent  of change in employment  occurs on late shifts. 
However, it is not possible to tell how much of the extra shift employ- 
ment is  associated with additional plant shifts. In many cases,  the 
addition  of shift labor must accompany  the addition  of the services of 
capital that was previously idle at night. Thus there is less reason  for a 
decline in labor  productivity  with cyclical expansion than there would 
be if the increased  labor  hours  were spread  across  a fixed  total  of capital. 
Regressions on the CPS data, separating  continuous from noncontin- 
uous process industries,  give results  consistent  with this picture. In the 
continuous  process industries  the elasticity of late shift employment  to 
total employment  is well below 1.0; in the noncontinuous  process in- 
dustries  it is well over 1.5. The two-digit detail shows substantial  sen- 
sitivity of late shift employment  in the capital-intensive  assembly in- 
dustries  in which  one would  expect shiftwork  to be an important  margin, 
but there are also some surprises. Petroleum,  for example, has a high 
elasticity. Shapiro runs similar regressions for nonmanufacturing  in- 
dustries. The most notable feature  of these results is the typically low 
elasticity of shift employment  for the service industries,  even in cases 
where a substantial  portion of the labor force is employed on a late 
shift. 
How useful are Shapiro's measures  of the workweek of capital for 
accounting  for the procyclical movements  in productivity?  He focuses 
on the standard  Solow total factor productivity  residual, which gives 
the percentage  change in output not explained by the share-weighted 
percentage  changes in inputs. As Robert  Solow first  noted, the cyclical 
movements  in the estimated  residual  can be reduced  by assuming  that 
capital services themselves move with a cyclical variable. Solow ex- 
amined  the implications  of adjusting  the capital stock by the employ- 
ment  rate  of labor. Shapiro  follows Solow's strategy  to assess a variety 
of other  candidates  that  might capture  the cyclical movement  in capital 
services. In particular,  he examines the implications  of assuming  that 
capital services are proportional  to energy use, materials  use, and his 
own estimate  of the workweek  of capital. Hence the standard  residual 
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plied by capital's share. For a pooled sample  of 450 industries  over the 
period 1977-88,  Shapiro  calculates  the correlation  between  the revised 
productivity  residual  and capacity  utilization, again  taken  as a measure 
of the cycle. The unadjusted  Solow residual  shows the expected  positive 
correlation  with capacity utilization. With adjustment  for variations  in 
the employment of capital, the cyclical nature of the residual is no 
longer clear. The energy use adjustment  substantially  reduces the cy- 
clical movement in the residual, the workweek of capital adjustment 
reduces the correlation  to near zero, and adjustment  by materials  use 
implies slightly countercyclical  behavior.  Shapiro  conducts  a more  for- 
mal test by regressing the residuals, adjusted  and unadjusted,  on total 
factor input growth, using instrumental  variables. As expected, the 
unadjusted  residual is highly cyclical, showing a substantial  and pre- 
cisely  estimated coefficient on total factor input growth. When the 
workweek of capital is used, the cyclicality of productivity largely 
disappears. Energy use and materials  use account almost as well for 
cyclic productivity.  For all manufacturing,  the results suggest that  it is 
best to adjust  the Solow residual  by the workweek  of capital, but  energy 
use and materials  use also appear  to be fairly good proxies for capital 
utilization. However, the workweek  of capital is not a relevant  margin 
for industries  that require  around-the-clock  operation. In these indus- 
tries, energy use and materials  use do a much better  job of explaining 
the residual. 
It is striking how important  the capital workweek is in explaining 
fluctuations  in capacity utilization for all manufacturing  and how suc- 
cessful it is at eliminating  cyclical movements  in estimated  productiv- 
ity, when it does not appear  to play such a major  role for many  industries 
individually. One explanation  for this paradox  is that the workweek  is 
serving as a proxy for other cyclical factors. But Shapiro  argues that 
the success of the workweek of capital in the noncontinuous  process 
industries  and its failure in the continuous  process industries  show that 
it is a genuine measure  of capital services, not merely a proxy cyclical 
indicator.  He further  examines this possibility by freely estimating  the 
coefficient on each of his measures  of the capital  workweek,  rather  than 
constraining  the coefficients, a priori, to capital's share. If the freely 
estimated  coefficient  differs  from capital's  share,  this is evidence  that  the 
measure  is proxying  for something  other  than  capital  services.  For aggre- 
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about  a third;  but  this difference  is not statistically  significant.  The results 
are quite similar  for the noncontinuous  process  industries  alone. For the 
continuous  process  industries,  however,  the coefficient  on the workweek 
is roughly  twice as large as it should  be if it were strictly  a measure  of 
capital  utilization.  It appears  that  in such  industries  it is proxying  for more 
general cyclical variation.  In separate  regressions,  Shapiro  finds over- 
whelming  evidence that neither  energy use nor materials  use is a good 
proxy  for capital  services. 
Shapiro  offers a number  of suggestions  for improving  the empirical 
measures  of the workweek  of capital.  He believes  that  the Survey  of Plant 
Capacity  is one of the best sources  of data  on the workweek  of capital  in 
U.S. manufacturing,  but  that  modest  changes  in survey  design  might  have 
substantial  benefits.  He urges  that  the SPC  be continued  on a regular  basis 
and that new data be added  on employment  per shift and on the size of 
the capital  stock. He also urges  the publication  of much  of this informa- 
tion, with various  improvements  in the weighting  of observations. 
Shapiro  concludes  that in industries  in which the shiftwork  margin  is 
operative, variation  in the workweek of capital explains a substantial 
amount  of the variation  in production  and virtually  all of the cyclical 
movement  in productivity.  Thus there  is no sign of increasing  returns  to 
scale. Nor is there  evidence of the productivity  shocks that are assumed 
by real business  cycle models. If such models are to have any claim to 
realism,  their  proponents  need to identify  some other  driving  force. 
THE  RAPID  GROWTH  achieved by many East Asian economies in 
recent  decades has prompted  a wide range of research  aimed at under- 
standing  how these economies grew and at drawing lessons for other 
developing nations. Yet all this scrutiny  has not produced  agreement 
about  the basic sources  of their  rapid  growth.  Uncertainty  remains  about 
the relative  contributions  of technical  progress  and  capital  accumulation 
and  the role  that  government  policies have played  in stimulating  growth. 
In the first of three symposium papers on the economies of the East 
Asian region, Susan Collins and Barry Bosworth review the areas of 
disagreement  about the sources of growth, conduct a new empirical 
analysis of growth using a large sample of countries  from all regions 
and at all stages of development, and provide new evidence about the 
proximate  sources of the extraordinary  growth in the region. 
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scriptions  for developing economies. Collins and Bosworth  reason  that 
if accumulation  of human and physical capital is the key,  countries 
wishing to grow fast must forgo consumption  in order  to achieve high 
levels of investment. If, instead, the key is to adopt  existing technolo- 
gies from more advanced  economies-closing  the idea gap-less  sac- 
rifice may be needed and more attention  to strategies  aimed directly at 
enhancing productivity  may be appropriate.  The authors  observe that 
the strategies  used to enhance  productivity  have ranged  widely, includ- 
ing targeted  intervention, subsidization  of industries  that have poten- 
tially high productivity,  market  friendly  liberalization,  and  the opening 
of trade and capital markets. They also observe that, in practice, the 
high-growth  Asian economies have adopted  a broad  range of govern- 
ment strategies aimed at both capital deepening and productivity  en- 
hancement. 
Collins and  Bosworth  begin their  empirical  analysis by using growth 
accounting  on eighty-eight countries that cover all stages of develop- 
ment. They apply a common  methodology  to the countries, decompos- 
ing the growth in output  per worker  from 1960 to 1994 into the contri- 
butions from the accumulation  of physical and human capital and a 
residual measuring  the change in total factor productivity.  While this 
methodology does not directly identify the fundamental causes of 
growth, the authors  reason  that it provides  essential information  on the 
proximate  sources  and  avoids many  of the statistical  problems  that  make 
the results  of direct  regression  analysis  suspect. The methodology  needs 
only a minimum  of assumptions:  sufficient competition  to ensure that 
the earnings of factors are proportional  to their productivities, so that 
income shares measure their relative importance  in production;  and 
constant  factor shares  through  time in each country, a condition  that is 
broadly supported  by the data. Any scale economies are attributed  to 
the productivity  residual. 
Collins and Bosworth depart  from the data used to measure  stocks 
of physical and human  capital in many previous studies. For physical 
capital, instead of using the usual assumption  that the share of output 
devoted to investment is a useful proxy for the capital stock-which 
would only be appropriate  for countries on steady-state equilibrium 
growth paths-they  construct  capital stock measures based on a per- 
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significant  correlation  between their measure  and the mean investment 
share, which indicates that the usual assumption  is questionable. The 
authors assume a fixed capital share of 0.35  in the main analysis, 
although  they show that their  results are robust  to varying  the assumed 
capital share between 0.3 and 0.4. 
To measure  human  capital, Collins and  Bosworth  start  with estimates 
of employment,  where  they are  available, and  unpublished  estimates  of 
the labor  force from the International  Labour  Organisation  where they 
are not. As measures  of labor quantity, the growth rate of these esti- 
mates differ from the population data that have been used in many 
earlier studies. To measure changes in labor quality, they construct 
weights based on the relative wage structure  for workers  with different 
years of schooling and use these to aggregate workers across educa- 
tional levels in each country.  The resultant  index of labor  quality  differs 
noticeably  from indexes that  simply weight by years of schooling with- 
out reference  to how years of schooling relate  to relative  earnings.  The 
authors assume that the benefits of education, as measured  by their 
quality index, are embodied in workers. 
Collins and Bosworth  present  the results of their growth  accounting 
for individual countries and also for aggregations of countries into 
several regions. They devote special attention  to the East Asian region 
(excluding Japan, which they include in the industrial  countries "re- 
gion," and China, because of the quality of the data). Their principal 
finding is that the extraordinary  growth in the East Asian economies 
has been driven by the accumulation  of capital, especially physical 
capital, rather  than by exceptional growth in total factor productivity. 
This result, which supports  earlier  research  by Alwyn Young, is robust 
for the region as a whole over the entire period 1960-94 and also for 
most individual  countries over shorter  subperiods.  However, for Tai- 
wan, Thailand,  and Singapore, and to a smaller  degree Korea, they do 
find  TFP growth  well above average  in the most recent interval, 1984- 
94. They also find that  TFP growth  has apparently  been rapid  in China 
over several  time intervals, including  the latest decade;  but  they review 
evidence from other sources indicating  that the official data may over- 
state Chinese output  and, thereby, the growth of TFP. They note that 
the contribution  of TFP in East Asia, while lower than  might  have been 
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in other developing regions. In sub-Saharan  Africa, the Middle East 
and North Africa, and Latin America, TFP growth has been negative 
since 1973. 
The authors  find that the contribution  of educational  advances has 
been larger in East Asia than in other regions, though it remains a 
relatively minor part of the growth story. They note that if,  as some 
argue, educational  attainment  brings  large spillover effects that are not 
captured  in individuals' earnings, this would imply a still smaller  role 
for pure TFP effects in East Asia. 
Collins and Bosworth acknowledge that their growth accounting 
framework  might  have trouble  distinguishing  between  the contributions 
of capital accumulation  and TFP growth, either because technical ad- 
vances might be embodied  in new capital  or because  TFP  growth  might 
induce  capital  accumulation  by raising  the returns  to capital. To further 
explore these issues, they turn to cross-country  regression analysis. 
They relate each country's growth  to measures  of its initial conditions 
and  the external  environment  that  other  researchers  have used-income 
per capita, life expectancy, years of schooling, the terms of trade  and 
its variability, and the investment share of GDP-and  to regional 
dummy  variables. They then perform  the same analysis to explain sep- 
arately the two components of  growth-capital  accumulation and 
TFP-calculated  from their growth accounting. 
The measures of initial and external conditions are significant in 
explaining  national  growth  rates, although  their  importance,  especially 
that of education  and the terms of trade, is substantially  reduced  when 
regional  dummies  are added. The dummies  indicate  that  the East Asian 
region grew substantially  faster  than  the other  underdeveloped  regions, 
even taking account of  the conditioning measures. When the same 
analysis is applied  to explain the components  of growth, the East Asian 
economies stand out for their capital accumulation  but not for TFP 
growth. Furthermore,  capital accumulation  and TFP growth  have only 
a very low correlation  across countries, contrary  to the prediction of 
some endogenous growth models. 
As to the role of  government, Collins and Bosworth distinguish 
between two groups of policies. The first comprises those generally 
agreed  to have been helpful, such as stable  macroeconomic  policies and 
the promotion  of education.  The second group  is more  controversial.  It 
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lective interventions.  The authors  use cross-country  regression  analysis 
of the components  of growth  to look at the extent to which these com- 
ponents can be explained by macroeconomic  variables and indicators 
of trade  policy. 
Overall, the authors  find that the macroeconomic  policy and open- 
ness measures  account  for about  one-third  of the otherwise  unexplained 
difference between growth in East Asia and other developing regions. 
Countries  with smaller budget deficits and more stable real exchange 
rates tend to grow more rapidly, smaller  deficits being associated with 
faster capital accumulation  and exchange rate stability associated with 
faster  TFP growth. They find  that  the index of openness  constructed  by 
Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew  Warner  (BPEA, 1:1995) is strongly associ- 
ated with growth. However, all of the association is with capital for- 
mation, not productivity  growth, which casts doubt  on Sachs and  War- 
ner's interpretation  that openness permits poorer countries to import 
modern technology from wealthier ones. Based on their results as a 
whole, Collins and Bosworth suggest that the search  for what worked 
in East Asia should be focused on what encouraged  capital accumula- 
tion. 
Finally, the authors  question  Paul  Krugman'  s pessimistic assessment 
of the prospects for continued rapid growth in East Asia. They show 
that for most countries in the region, the stock of physical capital per 
worker  is still less than half of that in the United States or Japan.  The 
quality of the labor force will continue to improve as well-educated 
younger cohorts replace less educated retirees. They reason that this 
and  the apparent  improvement  in TFP growth  in the most recent  decade 
can sustain the high return  to capital and encourage  the capital deep- 
ening that has been the main contributor  to growth in the region. 
JAPAN  WAS  THE  first  miracle  growth  economy and, throughout  much 
of the postwar  period, has been taken  as a model for others  to emulate. 
More recently, the boom and bust in Japan's  financial  markets  and the 
extended slump in its economy have prompted  doubts about the very 
institutions and policies that had previously been admired for their 
contributions  to economic growth. In the second symposium paper, 
Takatoshi  Ito looks at both the good and bad episodes in Japan's ex- 
perience and asks what lessons they may provide. 
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10 percent growth between  the late  1950s,  when GDP caught up with 
its prewar trend path,  and the early  1970s  as Japan's miracle  growth 
years. During the remainder of the 1970s and the 1980s,  growth slowed 
to less than half this rate, although it remained fast enough to continue 
to narrow the GDP gap with the United States. In contrast to other East 
Asian  miracle  economies,  total  factor productivity  was  the most  im- 
portant source of growth in Japan during its miracle years. 
Ito discusses  several features of the Japanese economy,  contrasting 
the positive  assessments  made of them during the years of rapid growth 
with  the  criticisms  made  of  them  since  the  economy  has  stagnated. 
Lifetime employment had been seen as stabilizing  the labor market and 
promoting a range of skills  through on-the-job training. With employ- 
ment growing slowly  or declining in many sectors, observers now ques- 
tion whether firms can keep the promise of lifetime  employment  in the 
future. They  also  fear that future growth industries will  require more 
specialized  skills  that may rapidly become  obsolete  and are therefore 
not suited to lifetime employment arrangements. The main bank system, 
in which banks own both debt and equity,  serve on boards, and monitor 
management, had been seen as eliminating the inefficiencies  associated 
with asymmetric information between  the providers and users of capi- 
tal.  Since  the  decline  in  stock  prices  and the  rise  in  loan  defaults, 
observers  now  question  the ability  of  banks to properly monitor cor- 
porations and allocate capital.  The horizontal and vertical keiretsu had 
been seen as monitoring their constituent  firms, promoting their long- 
run orientation,  and offering  them scale economies.  Now  keiretsu ap- 
pear less  relevant,  since  the sectors  that are expected  to grow  in the 
future are not associated with them. The government's  industrial policy 
had played an important role by targeting certain industries for growth 
and export promotion and providing them with subsidies and protection. 
Today,  industrial policy  is hardly relevant,  in part because  trade con- 
flicts have shifted Japanese priorities away from export promotion and 
toward domestic  consumption  and market opening. 
Looking ahead, Ito suggests that Japanese policymakers will actively 
pursue more liberal policies  on land use,  deregulation,  and other mea- 
sures to enhance competition.  Candidates for deregulation include air- 
lines, telecommunications  and broadcasting, financial services,  and dis- 
tribution.  He  also  notes  that major demographic  changes  will  affect 
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ing age to retirement age populations  is projected to decline  from 5.8 
in  1995  to  2.3  in  2025,  or even  lower  if  recent  low  birth rates  are 
maintained.  He  expects  that this  change  will  reduce  the  historically 
high  household  saving  rate and with  it the  current account  surplus, 
domestic  investment,  which has already declined in the 1990s,  or both. 
Ito finds both differences and commonalities  between Japan and other 
rapidly growing economies  in the region.  All have had relatively  well- 
educated  populations.  All  increased  the share of  exports  in GDP  and 
the share of manufacturing in total output. In most, government actively 
promoted the export sector.  However,  in contrast to Japan, most other 
Asian economies  either did not try to target industries for import sub- 
stitution,  or were unsuccessful  in doing  so.  While  in Japan securities 
markets have been inefficient  and banks have been the main financial 
intermediaries, in Hong Kong, Singapore,  and Malaysia securities mar- 
kets have been active.  Ito also notes that the East Asian economies  have 
differed  widely  in  their openness  to  foreign  investment  and in  their 
reliance on domestic  saving,  and he finds little relation between growth 
and changes  in real exchange  rates across countries. 
CHINA  HAS  GROWN  rapidly since the inception  of economic  reforms 
in  1978,  and real GDP growth has averaged  10 percent since  1984.  It 
has also emerged  as a significant trading nation,  accounting  for 3 per- 
cent of  world exports  in  1995.  While  other Asian  nations had earlier 
achieved  comparable  growth  rates,  starting with Japan in the  1950s, 
China's development  has been distinctive  in that the country had been 
a closely  controlled socialist  state and only gradually opened to private 
enterprise and the outside world.  But, even more than its history,  it is 
China's  size  that makes  it so  special  today.  In the third symposium 
paper of this volume,  Barry Naughton examines  China's development 
to date and projects some likely  features of its future development. 
In the initial stages,  China's reforms focused  on the domestic  econ- 
omy,  and the country moved  only  cautiously  away from its previous 
isolation  from  the  world  economy.  Naughton  shows  that trade was 
concentrated in special  economic  zones  (SEZs),  of which Guangdong 
province,  adjoining Hong Kong,  was and is the most prominent.  The 
SEZs had little connection  to the rest of the domestic economy,  and the 
foreign  investment  that they  attracted was  initially  aimed  at export 
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enterprises (FIEs) rose gradually to just over 4 percent of China's GDP. 
After  1991,  the pace  of  foreign  investment  quickened.  The output of 
FIEs soared to over  15 percent of GDP in 1994,  and more than half of 
this additional  output went  to the domestic  market rather than to ex- 
ports. As Naughton observes,  these abrupt  recent changes illustrate why 
simply  extrapolating  past trends is  inadequate for projecting  China's 
future growth and trade. To better inform such projections,  he analyzes 
structural changes  and the transition strategy underlying  current eco- 
nomic policies. 
One  key  structural  change  follows  from  China's  unusual  demo- 
graphic structure and its consequences  for labor force growth. Naughton 
reports that during  1978-91,  growth  of  the  working  age  population 
averaged 2.5  percent a year and growth of nonagricultural employment 
averaged 5.4  percent a year. Echoing the birth limitation policies  intro- 
duced in the mid-1970s,  growth in the working age population slowed 
to only  1.2 percent a year during 1991-95,  and the U.S.  Census Bureau 
projects zero growth by 2015.  Assuming  that agricultural employment 
continues  to decline  at the 2.1  percent rate of recent years,  Naughton 
projects  that annual nonagricultural employment  growth will  slow  to 
4.1  percent during 1995-2005,  to 2.2  percent in the following  decade, 
and to only  0.7  percent during 2015-25,  with  a corresponding  slow- 
down in total output growth. 
Naughton  stresses  that Chinese  policymakers  initially  viewed  rapid 
labor force  growth as a constraint on reforms that threatened to raise 
unemployment.  Until the 1990s,  the government took responsibility  for 
full employment  and promoted jobs  in agriculture, community-owned 
enterprises,  state-owned  enterprises  (SOEs),  urban collectives,  and 
government.  Starting in  1991,  this pattern has changed  dramatically. 
Employment  in broad categories  of private nonagricultural enterprises 
has risen three to four times as fast as it did in the previous five years, 
and agricultural employment has declined.  Employment in community- 
owned township and village  enterprises-which  compete in the market 
economy  even  though they are publicly  owned  and had been growing 
in number since  the inception  of reform-also  expanded sharply over 
this period. 
In  examining  China's  transition  strategy,  Naughton  distinguishes 
between its two main elements,  one concerned with introducing market 
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foreign  trade. The transition toward a market economy  has primarily 
relied  on the entry of new  domestic  producers rather than on the pri- 
vatization of state-owned enterprises. Today,  SOEs are concentrated in 
certain manufacturing industries,  utilities,  and natural resource extrac- 
tion; their share of industrial output declined  from 78 percent in 1978 
to  31  percent in  1995.  The  strategy for opening  to foreign  trade and 
world  market forces  has  been  more  complex.  Since  the  start of  the 
reforms,  China has taken many conventional  steps toward these ends: 
the currency has been devalued and the distinction between official and 
swap  market rates has been  eliminated;  restrictions  on convertibility 
have  been  greatly  eased,  with  full  current account  convertibility  ex- 
pected  by the end of  1996;  the right to trade has been  extended  to a 
great many firms; nontariff barriers have  been  substantially  reduced; 
and pricing for domestic  firms involved  in trade has been increasingly 
related to world prices. Although these measures represent considerable 
liberalization from the tightly closed  prereform economy,  most domes- 
tic firms still operate in a regime that is oriented toward import substi- 
tution,  with  imports  and exports  funneled  through  state-run foreign 
trade corporations. 
The major innovation  in the trade arena has been the creation of an 
export promoting regime,  in which rules and regulations  are designed 
to attract foreign investment and permit foreign-invested  enterprises to 
bypass the domestic  regime.  These FIEs, operating with a minimum of 
administrative interference and often with tax preferences,  are concen- 
trated in Guangdong and Fujian provinces-where  they have benefited 
greatly  from  proximity  to  Hong  Kong  and Taiwan-and  to  a lesser 
extent in other coastal provinces.  FIEs have been responsible  for much 
of  the  country's  export  growth.  Since  1991,  they  have  also  been  a 
growing factor in the domestic market, toward which they have directed 
over half of their rapidly increasing output. 
Although  Chinese  exports  have  expanded  rapidly,  Naughton  ob- 
serves  that the country's  economic  development  has proceeded  very 
differently from the export-led development  of Japan, Korea, and Tai- 
wan.  These  other  countries  restricted  foreign  investment  inflows, 
whereas China has encouraged them. They maintained stable, probably 
undervalued,  currencies  as  their exports  expanded,  whereas  China's 
real exchange rate has fluctuated, with a tendency toward overvaluation 
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domestically  owned  firms to manufacture and export,  whereas  China 
has relied on FIEs. 
The  special  circumstances  under which  the FIEs operate in China 
lends them some unusual characteristics.  Initially,  much of their export 
volume  came  from enterprises  based  in Hong  Kong  and Taiwan  that 
had relocated  the more labor-intensive  parts of  their production.  The 
Chinese  value  added in such exports is relatively  low.  More recently, 
domestic  firms have  gained  access  to  many of  the export  promotion 
regime's  preferences  by  forming  joint  ventures  with  FIEs.  Chinese 
value added content in their exports should be higher. Large investment 
inflows to China have contributed to substantial real appreciation of the 
yuan,  despite  the  accumulation  of  foreign  exchange  reserves  by  the 
government.  Naughton expects  direct foreign investment to continue at 
a high rate because the Chinese domestic market has such great growth 
potential.  Eventually,  as real appreciation reduces the competitiveness 
of the export sector,  he expects  FIE production for the domestic  econ- 
omy to offset  a slowdown  in export growth rates. From the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),  Naughton identifies the populous 
"ASEAN  four"  (Indonesia,  Thailand,  Malaysia,  and the Philippines) 
as direct competitors  with  China in the production of  labor-intensive 
exports.  He sees the ongoing  need for foreign investment as a force to 
pressure China and the ASEAN  nations to liberalize  their economies. 
Naughton  expects  Chinese  policymakers  to unify  the two  trade re- 
gimes  in coming  years.  To do so would  broaden the country's  export 
base and reduce the distortions of the present dual system,  recover some 
revenues  now lost to tax preferences  in the export regime,  and tap the 
human skills  that are located outside the SEZs.  A broader export base 
would extend the prosperity that a few coastal provinces  have recently 
enjoyed  and help  to  meet the competition  that is  arising from other, 
less-developed  countries  in the region.  However,  Naughton  believes 
that the single  system that evolves  from the unification of the two trade 
regimes  will  be less  liberal for the FIEs than their present regime with 
all its preferences. 
IN  THE  FIRST  of  three  extended  comments  by  symposium  partici- 
pants,  Stanley  Fischer  emphasizes  how  much economists  still  do not 
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nations of the region have pursued a range of specific policies,  so that 
no one can be identified as crucial to success.  While research like that 
reported in the papers of this symposium provides useful generalizations 
about  what  aids  growth,  not  all  countries  fit these  general  findings 
either.  Even  the  undoubtedly  correct  emphasis  on  capital  formation 
leaves  Hong Kong as an exception.  And how to raise saving rates and 
encourage capital formation remains a difficult question. 
While  acknowledging  these  gaps  in  economists'  understanding, 
Fischer does describe broad features that he believes  contributed to the 
success  of  most  successful  economies  and could  inform  the  policy 
choices  of other countries wishing  to grow.  Governments were adapt- 
able;  they  relied  on  the private  sector  for production  and on  market 
forces  to provide  competition,  even  while  using  industrial policies  to 
direct resource flows.  Governments  also laid heavy emphasis on mac- 
roeconomic  stability and reacted swiftly  against a threat of instability. 
No country tolerated double-digit inflation, none pursued an excessively 
easy macroeconomic  policy,  and most have had small governments and 
small budget deficits. 
Fischer finds particular grounds for optimism about development  in 
the  successes  of  Malaysia,  Indonesia,  and Thailand.  Unlike  China, 
Japan, or Korea,  none  of  these  countries  had ever been  an advanced 
economy  in  the  past.  What  is  more,  Malaysia  has  succeeded  while 
ensuring that the benefits  of  growth reach the indigenous  population, 
and Indonesia seemed an unlikely candidate for sustained growth thirty 
years ago.  Each of these countries has shown good economic  manage- 
ment, although with different styles; government has been very active 
in Malaysia  and Indonesia  but less  so  in Thailand.  Each country has 
broad-based primary education,  and each has been relatively  open to 
imports and has maintained reasonable  macroeconomic  stability.  Al- 
though these  countries  are running large current account deficits  and 
experiencing  large capital inflows,  and therefore are vulnerable to an 
abrupt reversal of confidence,  Fischer believes  that their current high 
rates of investment provide protection  against such a shock,  since  re- 
ducing investment provides a relatively  smooth way to adjust. Looking 
beyond the East Asian successes,  he notes that Chile has stabilized and 
raised its growth rate, although it has few  of the characteristics  com- 
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and in New  Zealand,  which  is a more recent success  story with little 
resemblance  to the East Asian countries,  it took years from the begin- 
ning of reform and stabilization  before the growth process took hold. 
Fischer  concludes  with  a distinctly  positive  assessment  of  growth 
prospects  for the East Asian region  and for other regions  as well.  He 
calls  particular attention to India,  where reforms have begun to yield 
steady growth of about 5 to 6 percent a year,  which could quicken as 
the growth process  takes hold.  And he believes  that rapid growth in 
India, in turn, will  help to start the growth process elsewhere  in South 
Asia. 
MOST  STUDIES  of East Asian economies  have focused  on the contri- 
bution of positive  elements  to growth.  By contrast,  in the second  ex- 
tended comment Edward Lincoln observes that all Asian nations have, 
at some time,  operated with some degree of official  corruption, private 
collusion,  artificial prices,  and other interferences with market forces, 
and he considers  why these obvious  mistakes and distortions have not 
had clear  negative  effects.  He  suggests  that the  costs  of  such  rent- 
seeking  activities  might  become  important  in  the  longer  run,  even 
though they have not suppressed entrepreneurial activity to the point of 
choking  off  growth.  As  an example,  he  notes  that the  moral hazard 
inherent in the  structure of  Japanese banking eventually  led  to huge 
losses  and bad debts and warns that China and other Asian nations may 
face  similar problems in the future. 
In the wake  of  Japan's rapid development,  governmental  involve- 
ment in the economy  through industrial policy  has received  particular 
attention from both policymakers  and analysts.  Lincoln  notes that Ja- 
pan's  growth  occurred  with  rapid gains  in total  factor  productivity, 
which,  in turn, were commonly  attributed to its wide-ranging industrial 
policies.  Many observers thought the Japanese pattern typical of Asian 
nations generally.  Yet the Collins  and Bosworth paper in this volume, 
as well  as some earlier studies,  show that productivity growth has not 
been exceptional  in Asian  economies  other than Japan, a finding that 
could call into question the contribution of industrial policies.  However, 
Lincoln  observes  that by providing  a generally  favorable environment 
for business,  with the government guiding and subsidizing  investment 
and tolerating cartels that protect profits, industrial policy  reduced nor- William  C. Brainard  and George L. Perry  xxxiii 
mal short-term business risk and encouraged banks to lend and firms to 
invest.  He thus reasons that industrial policies  may have been a force 
for growth through their effects  on capital formation,  even  if they did 
not yield  exceptional  gains in productivity. 
Lincoln  notes  two  important side  effects  of  such policies.  One  is 
domestic  misallocation  of  investment,  which  often  becomes  apparent 
only after some time.  The other is the impact that such overinvestment 
in particular industries has on other nations whose  own industries are 
threatened by the overproduction.  He observes that this adverse impact 
on  other  producers  has  been  the  source  of  extended  trade conflicts 
between  the United  States  and Japan,  and that it now  motivates  the 
U.S.  government's  efforts to have China conform to World Trade Or- 
ganization  (WTO) rules and to push the Asia Pacific Economic  Coop- 
eration (APEC)  as a vehicle  for moving  Asian  nations to adopt open 
trading policies. 
Lincoln  identifies  political  stability  as  an important ingredient  of 
successful  growth in many Asian countries.  He contrasts their situation 
with the often violent political environment in Africa, ideological  strug- 
gles  in Latin America,  and ongoing  conflicts  in the Middle  East.  He 
also observes  that within Asia,  those countries that have most recently 
suffered from war or violent repression, including Vietnam, Cambodia, 
Burma,  and the Philippines,  have  had the weakest  economic  perfor- 
mance.  Looking  ahead,  he  sees  political  uncertainty  as  the  biggest 
potential stumbling block in Asia's  economic  future. 
IN  THE  THIRD  extended  comment,  Yung  Chul  Park discusses  two 
important features of the growth of the East Asian economies  and their 
integration with the economies  of Europe and North America. The first 
is the widespread acceptance  of liberal economic  policies.  The second 
is the emergence  of  China as a trading nation.  Liberalization  has led 
most  of  the  East  Asian  countries  to  lower  tariff  rates  and nontariff 
barriers and to open and deregulate their capital markets. Trade outside 
the region has developed  along  lines  of  comparative  advantage,  with 
the East Asian nations exporting manufactured goods to and importing 
services  from Europe  and North  America.  The  opening  of  financial 
markets has attracted foreign  capital,  which,  in turn, has spurred the 
investment  boom.  The emergence  of  China has led to growing  trade 
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to propel their economic  growth and encouraged the integration of all 
the economies  in the region. 
As  useful  as these  developments  have  been,  Park notes  that some 
observers see them posing problems for the future. In particular, port- 
folio  investment  to the East Asian  countries excluding  Japan is often 
voiced  as  a concern.  It surged  from  $10  billion  in  1983-89  to  $63 
billion in 1990-94,  and, some believe,  could be withdrawn at any time, 
leading to financial chaos like that recently experienced by Mexico.  He 
recalls Krugman's warning that such instability could emerge as inves- 
tors recognize  that East Asia's  rapid growth is bound to slow  because 
it has been based on high levels  of investment rather than on increases 
in efficiency.  Park does  not agree that such a pessimistic  outcome  is 
inevitable,  or even  very  likely.  He  argues  that rapid growth  can  be 
sustained  if  investment  rates remain high and that the foreign  capital 
inflows  needed  to finance investment  will  remain strong if the rate of 
return to capital remains high,  as he expects.  Although the longer-term 
incentives  to foreign  investment  thus remain strong, he acknowledges 
that there is a genuine risk of destabilizing  speculation.  To discourage 
speculative  inflows  and outflows,  he  suggests  some  form  of  capital 
controls,  coordinated internationally  so as not to interfere with global 
financial integration. 
Park discusses  the worries that other East Asian nations have about 
China.  First,  they doubt that China will  open its markets to the same 
extent that they have done or that China will  abide by the rules of fair 
trade. As  a consequence,  they fear that they will  be inundated by in- 
expensive  Chinese  manufactured goods  and thus experience  a slow- 
down  in real wage  growth,  especially  for unskilled  workers.  Second, 
they  worry that China's  bilateral trade surplus with the United  States 
could  provoke  a protectionist  backlash  against  the whole  East Asian 
region.  And third, they fear that China will  use its growing  influence 
and power to play its economic  rivals off against each other. 
To head off such outcomes,  Park sees an urgent need for the United 
States  and the European Union  to assist  China's  entry into the world 
trading community.  Bringing China into the WTO would permit depar- 
tures from fair trade to be taken up in a multilateral forum. Membership 
in the WTO would also make it easier for China's central government 
to deal with protectionist pressures arising in individual provinces.  Park 
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and to reduce the dependence  of other East Asian nations on China by 
starting discussions  to bring them into the North American Free Trade 
Agreement.  Finally,  he suggests  that ASEAN  be expanded to include 
the poorer nations  of  the region  so  as to reduce their dependence  on 
China and facilitate  closer  trade relations with countries outside Asia. 